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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to show that the existence of a concrete outside
option for rmsexecutives can induce, under specic circumstances, every rm to
adopt restrictive output practises. In particular, the paper characterizes the con-
ditions for which, under Cournot oligopoly, existing rms behave more collusively
than in a standard Cournot model. It is also shown that room exists for perfect
and stable collusive agreements amongst rms. Other interesting ndings are also
twofold. Firstly, that the equilibrium executives pay will usually be dependant
upon the number of companies initially disposing of the technology and/or of the
organizational knowledge required to set up the business. Secondly, that companies
procedures di¢ cult to duplicate can constitute a benecial form of competition pol-
icy in that they induce the rms to behave less collusively in the product market.
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1. Introduction
Usually the outside option of companies executives o¢ cers (CEOs) and, in general,
of highly trained workers, takes the form of alternative o¤ers made by other (often
competitor) rms. This form of at-will employment does not necessarily mean that each
company is completely vulnerable to the disclosure of its strategic informations after
the CEOsdeparture. Trade Secret Acts (like the Uniform TSA in U.S.), corporate
policies on trade secrets as well as postemployment restrictive covenants, such as non
disclosure and nonsolicitation agreements, are all tools that large companies adopt to
avoid a too great temptation for CEOs and other important employees to walk o¤
stealing companys informations.1
However, there are well known cases in which CEOs decide to leave their company to
set up independent business, mainly as a result of a solid organizational and managerial
experience acquired in the eld. In fact, in industries in which a relatively small num-
ber of cutthroat competitors control most of the market, a noncompete clause cannot
realistically be imposed on executives. It might be either too expensive for the guar-
anteed contracts that senior o¢ cers would demand if asked to accept it, or it might
simply be an uncommon practise in the industry. Moreover, when CEOs set up new
ventures based on their organizational and market experience, companies do not really
have grounds for a good lawsuit. It can be di¢ cult to achieve evidence from which a
court can infer that either customer lists, pricing and marketing plans or simply the
company organizational style have been stolen.
The relevance of the outside option or going rate in a¤ecting executivespay is
empirically recognized [see, for instance, Smith and Szymanski (1995)].2 CEOs de-
fection to set up independent businesses can be considered more likely in industries
in which xed costs are not particularly high and the companys experience is easily
duplicable.Whether the answer of existing rmsowners should be, on the one hand,
that of increasing the existing market competition - to reduce the value of potential
entrants - on the other it may simply be that of adopting a collusive output choice as a
result. In any case, whenever the companys environment naturally discloses strategic
informations to a few rms insiders, executivespay should be responsive of the existing
outside options and hence, of the features of the market in which the rm operates.
1See, for instance, the recent case study When an Executive Defects, Harvard Business Review,
January-February 1997, pp. 18-34.
2Related empirical works on managers pay and rmsperformance are, amongst others, Murphy
(1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990) and Gregg et al. (1993).
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The purpose of this paper is to show that the existence of a concrete outside option
for rmsexecutives can induce, under specic circumstances, every rm to adopt re-
strictive output practises. In particular, the paper characterizes the conditions under
which, in a Cournot oligopoly, existing rms behave more collusively than in a stan-
dard Cournot model. It is also shown that room exists for perfect and stable collusive
agreements amongst rms. Other interesting ndings are also twofold. Firstly, that the
equilibrium executivespay will usually be dependant upon the number of companies
that initially dispose of the technology and/or of the organizational knowledge required
to set up the business. Secondly, that companiesprocedures di¢ cult to duplicate can
constitute a benecial form of competition policy, by inducing the rms to behave less
collusively in the product market. This is because rms are less worried to lose their
informational advantages in favour of potential defecting rms insiders.
Di¤erent setups related to the paper topic are contained, among the others, in Fen-
stein and Stein (1988), Mailath and Postlewaite (1990) and Stole and Zwiebel (1997).
The results presented in this paper can also be compared to the well known (and op-
posite) result [Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1987), Sklivas (1987)] that under
Cournot oligopoly the presence of managersincentives related to sales can induce each
company to behave less collusively than simple entrepreneurial rms (i.e., which man-
aged by just the owner).
The paper is organized as follows. The next section briey presents the structure of
the model. Section 3 introduces a simple model specication to show the main paper
ndings. Section 4 is devoted to extend some of the model results to a more general
framework. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. The structure of the model
The model describes an oligopolistic industry in which, at the beginning, only n owners
can establish a business based on their knowledge. This exclusive knowledge represents
the only barrier to entry for other potential competitors (for instance the rms exec-
utives, henceforth labelled as managers) assumed to need a specic on-the-job training
to start a new business. Thus, in the industry, the n owners are assumed to set up
n (identical) rms behaving à la Cournot and producing a homogenous commodity y:
The assumed sequence of strategies is quite simple. Firstly, every owner decides how
much commodity to produce (and thus, how many identical managers to hire), accord-
ing to the usual prot maximization procedure. Secondly, the owner has to x the
level of every managers remuneration, indicated as v: Hence, every recruited managers
can either decide to stay, accepting v; or leave, to set up a competing company in
the industry, thus earning a prot of  (n+ 1). Every manager that has become owner
continues the game exactly as before (i.e., rst deciding y (n+ 1) and then v (n+ 1)
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for her or his recruited managers) and the game goes on in this way, with an innite
horizon. The solution concept used to solve the game is a standard subgame Nash
equilibrium.3 An equilibrium of the game is thus a vector of Nash equilibrium quanti-
ties
 
y1 (v (n+ k)) ; y2 (v (n+ k)) ; :::; yn+k (v
 (n+ k))

, where v is every managers
equilibrium remuneration and k is the number of new entrants that have entered the
market in equilibrium.
3. A simple example
Let us assume that in an a certain industry n owners, initially disposing of the knowledge
on how to produce a homogenous commodity y; set up n (identical) rms behaving à
la Cournot. Let also the available technology be described by the following constant
returns to scale production function:
yi = m
  `(1 ) (3.1)
where respectively m is the number of managers recruited by every i-th rm (i =
1; :::n) and ` is the number of unskilled workers. Let us assume, for simplicity, that
 = 1=2: Let also every rms xed cost be equal to zero. To reduce the notation,
the wage paid to unskilled workers can be normalized to one, while v will denote each
managers compensation. Moreover, let the market demand be linear and equal to:
p (Y ) = a  Y (3.2)
where Y =
nP
i=1
yi is the total quantity of commodity delivered to the market.
Deriving by (2.1) every rms cost function as:
Ci (yi) = 2
p
v  yi (3.3)
it is straightforward to get every n-th rms Cournot equilibrium prot as:
i (n) =
(a  2pv)2
(n+ 1)2
(3.4)
The basic feature of the model is that, when managers are hired by a rms owner,
they immediately acquire the specic knowledge (e.g., something about the rms or-
ganization) that enables them to become potential competitors of the existing rms.
Hence, managers compensation must be optimally decided by every owner knowing
each managers potential threat of leaving the rm to setup, through the use of un-
skilled workers (and possibly other managers), a new production unit.
3Extensions of this game to coalitional deviations are contained in Marini (1997).
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3.1. Case I: every leaving manager can just set up an entrepreneurial rm
For introductory purposes, a rst application of the model deals with the simplest case
in which every leaving manager is able to set up just an entrepreneurial rm. This
means that the stock of knowledge (e.g., organizational) stored within every rm is
complex and cannot be acquired in full by each manager working for it. Since the
knowledge that every hired manager can achieve is incomplete, it is assumed that her
or his actual outside option amounts to the possibility of setting up an ine¢ cient type
of organization, i.e., an entrepreneurial rm.
It is not di¢ cult to obtain from (2.1)-(2.3) the equilibrium quantity of every (n+ 1)-
th entrepreneurial rm (with m = 1) created by a leaving manager,
ym (n+ 1) =
a+ 2n
p
v
3n+ 4
(3.5)
and the corresponding equilibrium prot as:
m (n+ 1) =
2 (a+ 2n
p
v)
2
(3n+ 4)2
(3.6)
For simplicity, expressions (2.5)-(2.6) assume that only managers that voluntarily
leave a rm can decide to set up new companies, whereas managers red as e¤ect of
every rms market share reduction are assumed to become unemployed.4 Another
assumption, that will be shown later to be endogenous, is that every existing rms
owner whose manager(s) decides to leave can replace him (them) using unemployed
managers. Furthermore, for every owner behaving in such a manner must be the best
action to take.5
Every owner that wants to avoid her or his managers leaving, knowing (2.6) will x
their compensation such that:6
v = m (n+ 1) =
2 (a+ 2n
p
v)
2
(3n+ 4)2
(3.7)
4 Including in each rms best-reply function the option for red managers to create new rms com-
plicates the analysis without really changing the type of results obtained. However, this assumption
will be removed for the more general case treated in the next subsection.
5Actually, as long as there exists a pool of unemployed managers, owners are completely indi¤erent
whether to hire an unemployed manager or just recruit one of those currently working for other identical
rms.
6Here the assumption is that an owner bargains with each manager, taking other managersbehaviour
as given. Including a collective bargaining process or a di¤erent ownersconjecture would not drastically
change the nature of ensuing results.
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from which an equilibrium managerscompensation as a function of the number of rms
active in the market can be obtained as:7
v (n) =
a2
p
2 (3n+ 4)  4n2
(n2 + 24n+ 16)2
(3.8)
Moreover, as long as there is positive protability, every owner will always prefer to keep
managers inside the rm rather than let them leaving to reduce their remuneration. This
is proved by the following lemma.
Lemma 1. As long as, p (Y  (n)) > ACi (yi (n)) ; the following inequality holds for
every i = 1; ::n:
i (v
 (n) ; n) > i (v
 (n+ 1) ; n+ 1) (3.9)
Proof. (See Appendix).
Now, knowing that each owner hires a certain number of managers (otherwise, due
to production function (2.1), rms output and prot would be equal to zero) and,
under positive protability, she or he pays them the equilibrium compensation v (n)
(by lemma 1), a rst result of the analysis is presented below.
Proposition 1. Under Cournot equilibrium and under the assumptions of the model,
when the initial number of rms is no greater than n, the equilibrium number of man-
agers m selected by every owner is less than it would be under standard neoclassical
assumptions.
Proof. Since m = y
ip
v
; and yi is monotonically decreasing in v; it ensues that
m (v (n)) < m (v) as long as v (n) > v;where v indicates the neoclassical mar-
ket clearing wage. From expression (2.8) condition v (n) > v exactly happens for
n < n = a
p
2
p
17+12
p
2 pv(12+8p2)p
v(17+12
p
2)
:
In the gure below v (n) is plotted against di¤erent number of rms initially active
in the market and compared to a given market clearing wage v. Managerscompensation
decreases with the number of rms existing in the market. Notice also that, since for
certain levels of n the equilibrium managers compensation is higher than the given
market level, there will usually be a number of unemployed managers. This endogenous
availability of managers allows for their substitution when they decide to leave the rm.
7Equation (2.7) presents two solutions, among which, expression (2.8) (the lowest one) will be selected
by every rms owner.
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Fig 2.1-Values of v(n) and w=v for a=350 and n=1;::20:
In th is example v(n) is equal to v=10 for n=8.
Moreover, it can be noticed that yi (v (n) ; n) is, for every rm, dependent upon the
equilibrium managerscompensation. Thus, since v (n) is, for n <n, higher than v; it
turns out that, whenever n < n, yi (v
 (n) ; n) < yi (v; n) : This means that each rm is,
within a given range of n, more collusive in terms of output than under the usual market
clearing conditions. There also exists an initial number of rms for which yi (v
 (n) ; n)
exactly coincides with the perfectly collusive output choice, i.e., that obtained when all
rms cooperatively maximize their joint prot. The next proposition describes these
results.
Proposition 2. The output selected by every rm under Cournot equilibrium and
managersthreat to leave is more collusive than under Cournot equilibrium and man-
agerscompetitive market for n <n, that is, yi (v
 (n) ; n) < yi (v; n) for n <n. More-
over, there exists a level of n = n such that, yi (v
 (n) ; n) = yci (v; n
) ; where yci is
the output resulting by cooperative agreement among rms.
Proof. By proposition 1, for n <n, v (n) is greater than v. Since rms equilibrium
output is monotonically decreasing in v; it follows that, for n <n, yi (v
 (n) ; n) <
yi (v; n).
Moreover, substituting expression (2.8) for v (n) into yi yields:
yi (v
 (n) ; n) =
a

n2 + 32n+ 16 p2 (6n  8)
(n2 + 24n+ 16) (n+ 1)
(3.10)
while, the collusive quantity under market clearing managerscompensation v is:
yci (v; n) =
a  2pv
2n
(3.11)
Thus, expression (2.10) is equal to (2.11) , for n = n; where n is the only positive
solution of an equation that, for ease of brevity, is not presented here. It is obvious that
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the higher the managersmarket clearing wage is and the lower will be the number of
rms for which yi (v (n) ; n) = yci (v; n) :
A particular example of the result above is presented in gure 2.2. Obviously,
for n = 1 and given v; the perfect collusive equilibrium quantity yci (v; n) coincides
with the Nash equilibrium quantity yni (v; n). Interestingly, for n = 2; the collusive
quantity yic (v; n) exactly coincides with yi (v (n) ; n) : Moreover, since every rms
quantity yi (v (n) ; n) is also a Nash equilibrium quantity, it will be stable against
each rms temptation to deviate from the equilibrium choice of output, di¤erently to
what usually happens under collusive agreement. Finally, it can be noticed that such a
particular example of non-cooperative collusive solution can take place either through
mergers among rms (when the initial number of rms n is higher than n) or through
a controlled departure of managers induced by a rm (when n is lower than n and the
prot is negative).
0 5 10
0
100
200
300
400
500
yn( )n
ym( )n
yc( )n
n
Fig.2.2 - Equilibrium quantity respectively for a usual Cournot rm with
a given wage v yn(n), for a Cournot rm rm under managersthreat ym(n)
and for a perfectly collusive rm (yc(n)) (a=1000; v=10;n=1;::10):
Thus, in this rst example whether the behaviour of existing rms is less or more
collusive than in a usual Cournot model depends upon the initial number of rms that
know how to organize the rms activity.
3.2. Case II: every leaving manager can set up a managerial rm
This section removes the assumption made previously that every leaving manager can
set up only entrepreneurial rms. Here a manager can leave the rm and set up a
company that is virtually identical to the one she or he is working for. Widening every
managers outside option is a simple device to describe the case in which existing rms
(organizational) knowledge is not very complex and can thus be fully acquired by every
single manager.
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In this situation, expression (2.6) simply becomes:
i (n+ 1) =

a  2pv (n+ 1)2
(n+ 2)2
(3.12)
and the equilibrium managerial compensation is thus equal to:
v (n) =

a  2pv (n+ 1)2
(n+ 2)2
(3.13)
Expression (2.13) is a non linear di¤erence equation that can be solved by iteration
on the number k of new entrants. The fact that v (n) = i (n+ 1), implies, when
prots are decreasing in n, that there exists an arbitrary number of entrants k for
which v (n+ k) = i (n+ k + 1) = 0: This fact can be used to achieve the equilibrium
managers compensation. The appendix proves that lemma 1 also applies in this case.
When lemma 1 holds, expression (2.13) can be solved for v, obtaining:
v (n) =
(
kP
i=0
h
( 1)i  2iai iQ
j=k
(n+ 3 + j) + ( 1)k+1  2k+1a)2
k+1Q
i=0
(n+ 2 + i)2
(3.14)
An interesting feature of expression (2.15) is that it converges to a nite value for
a low number of k new entrant rms. Moreover, as in the other example, the value of
v decreases monotonically with the number of existing rms: These features allow to
achieve the results presented in the next proposition.
Proposition 3. Under managersthreat to set up new managerial rms, the equilib-
rium number of managers hired by every existing rm is equal to one, i.e., m (v (n)) =
1: Moreover, there exists a number of rms n for which the choice of managers coincides
with that of a neoclassical setting. The output selected by every rm will thus be more
collusive than in a standard Cournot model for n <n, that is, yi (v
 (n) ; n) < yi (v; n) for
n <n. Moreover, there exists a level of n = n for which, yi (v
 (n) ; n) = yci (v; n
) ;
where yci is the output resulting by a perfect cooperative agreement among rms.
Proof. Straightforward manipulations of expression (2.15) show that it converges to a
nite value equal to:
v (n) =
a2
 
n5 + 23n4 + 205n3 + 881n2 + 1818n+ 1412
2h
(n+ 2)2
h
(n+ 3)2
h
(n+ 4)2
h
(n+ 5)2
h
(n+ 6)2 (n+ 7)2
iiiii (3.15)
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From (2.1), (2.3) and (2.16) it follows that:
m (v (n)) = y
i
i (v
(n))p
v(n)
=
 
n6 + 25n5 + 249n4 + 1255n3 + 3342n24392n+ 2192

(n5 + 23n4 + 205n3 + 881n2 + 1818n+ 1412)2
2 [1; 1:5)
whatever is the number of existing rms. The closest integer to m (v (n)) is
thus equal to one. Hence, it turns out that m (v (n)) = m (v) for n = a 3
p
vp
v
; and
yi (v
 (n) ; n) < yi (v; n) for n <n. As in proposition 2, also in this case there exists a n

such that yi (v
 (n) ; n) = yci (v; n
) : The gure shows a simple example of this result
for given values of parameters and a range of n. It can be noticed that, for n = 220;
yi (v
 (n) ; n) = yci (v; n) :
0 200 400 600
0
2
4
6
yc ( )n
yn ( )n
n
Fig. 2.3 - Equilibrium quantity both for the managerial rm
ym(n) and for the perfectly collusive rm (yc(n)) (a=1000; v=10;n=0;::600):
It can be noticed that, by including among leaving managers those red as e¤ect of
every companys market share reduction would not change the nal result that just one
manager is hired in equilibrium by every rm. Furthermore, the set of results presented
in proposition 1, 2 and 3 allows for a unifying conclusive proposition. This expresses
the fact that, under the model simplifying assumptions, the easier the acquisition of the
rms knowledge by the managers is, the higher will be the degree of collusion put in
place by every rm.
Proposition 4. Under the model assumptions, the rmsdegree of output collusion is
increasing in the level of managersoutside option.
Proof. It follows from proposition 1, 2 and 3. In fact, it is easy to see that the number
of managers recruited and the output level of every rm in equilibrium is higher in the
case I than in the case II. A continous set of outside options between these two extreme
cases can easily be modeled by imposing that an intermediate number of managers
(more than 1 but less than that of a managerial rm) can be hired by every new entrant
rm. This would imply the result.
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4. Some generalizations of the model
This section is devoted to give some generality to the results obtained above as well as
to discuss which basic assumptions are strictly required to achieve the main ndings of
the model.
Under the following standard assumptions that:
A.3.1 The payo¤ of each rm is a function of its own strategy and the sum of
strategies of all existing rms (usually dened as aggregation axiom; see, for instance,
Dubey, Mas-Colell and Shubik (1980));
A.3.2 The strategy sets Yi are, for each rm, compact and convex;
A.3.3 The payo¤ function of every rm, i : Yi  <+ ! <+; is twice continuously
di¤erentiable;
A.3.4 @
2p(Y )
@Y 2
yi +
@p(Y )
@Y < 0;
A.3.5 @p(Y )@Y   @
2Ci(yi)
@y2i
< 0; (A.3.4 and A.3.5 are standard assumptions for second
order conditions to hold, see, for instance, Friedman (1977));
A.3.6 The output of every rm is strictly decreasing in the managers pay v;
It can be proved that:
i) A Cournot-Nash equilibrium (y1; y2; :::; yn) always exists and is unique (see, for
instance, Corchon (1996), p.15);
ii) Condition i (n) > 

i (n+ k) for (k = 1; 2; :::;1) always hold under rms posi-
tive protability (see lemma 2, in the appendix).
From i) and ii), the following proposition can be derived.
Proposition 5. Under Cournot oligopoly and managersthreat to leave, when assump-
tions A.3.1-A.3.6 hold, there is always a number of rms below which equilibrium man-
ager compensation is higher than market clearing neoclassical wage. Moreover, within
this range of n; the output is more collusive than in a standard Cournot model.
Proof. Result ii) implies that, for (k = 0; 1; :::;1), v (n) is monotonically decreasing
in n: Hence, it is always possible to nd a n =n such that v (n) = v and then for n <n,
v (n) > v. Furthermore, from A.3.5 it ensues that, for n < n, yi (v
 (n)) < yi (v) :
It can be interesting to spend a few words in discussing the meaning of A.3.5.
Coupled with A.3.4, it ensures that every rms payo¤ is concave, from which, second
orders conditions for a maximum are satised. This in turn requires either a not too
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convexdemand function or a not too concavecost function with respect to output.
By assuming (without loss of generality) a linear technology, it is easy to see that:
p
0   C 00i < 0) p
0   @
2v (n)
@y2i
yi   2
@v (n)
@yi
< 0 (4.1)
Note in general that the model assumptions always ensure that both @
(n+1)
@yi
< 0
and thus, @v
(n)
@yi
< 0 and that @
2(n+1)
@y2i
< 0 and then @
2v(n)
@y2i
< 0: Hence, every rms
cost function will be concave. Given a regular demand function, what is thus required
for the collusive e¤ect to take place is a not too concave cost function. Condition
(3.1) shows that for every rm the choice of yi yields, beside the usual negative e¤ect
on the demand function, an indirect e¤ect on managerscompensation. This e¤ect has
two components: the rst is which to reduce the pay of every manager through the
fall of her or his outside option, i.e., the threat to set up a new rm. The second is
which to reduce the other subsequent potential (n + k) -th leaving managersoutside
option and, hence, increasing which of the initial (n + 1)-th manager. By taking the
second derivative of v (n) with respect to yi and applying the model specication used
in section 2, it turns out that:
@2v (n)
@y2i
= lim
k!1
kX
j=1
( 1)(j+1)  p00 
kY
j=1
yn+j (4.2)
Condition (3.1) may certainly hold when expression (3.2) is not too negative.
This implies to impose that the chain e¤ect on every (n+ k)-th entrants has su¢ cient
strenght to almost o¤set the direct e¤ect of an output increase on every (n+ 1)-th
leaving managers outside option. The same result would ensue by assuming that every
managers learning process requires a certain period of time to be completed. In this
case, there would always be a discount factor  2 (0; 1) su¢ ciently high for rmspayo¤
to fall with the number of entrants k and hence, for the collusive e¤ect to take place.
5. Concluding Remarks
The paper has described, through an extremely simple model, that companies owners
need to x a level of compensation high enough to keep managers within the rm can
give rise to a collusive choice of output stable against individual rms deviations. The
result holds when the depressive e¤ect of leaving managers on rmsprot prevails on
the positive e¤ect due to a reduction of their compensation. Furthermore, the model
generates the empirically appealing property (see, for instance, Watson et al.(1994)) that
managerscompensation is decreasing with the number of rms existing in the market
and, consequently, with their size. The nature of every companys knowledge also plays
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a role. When the rms (organizational or technological) procedures are di¢ cult to
duplicate, the owner can hire a reasonably high number of managers without being
afraid that they will become competitors. In this case, the equilibrium output can be
close to which of a Cournot standard model, even if, a form of tacit collusion can also
be reached when a small number of rms operate in the market. Conversely, when
companies procedures are easily duplicable (as in traditional businesses) the model
predicts a very low number of recruited managers (m = 1) coupled with companies
output restrictions. In this respect, given the initial number of rms operating in an
industry, complex and heterogenous companys procedures can be benecial in terms of
level of output and competition generated in the market.
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6. Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. As long as, p (Y  (n)) > ACi (yi (n)) ; the following inequality
holds for every i = 1; ::n:
i (v
 (n) ; n) > i (v
 (n+ 1) ; n+ 1) (.1)
Proof. The meaning of expression (.1) is that, under positive protability of existing
rms, every companys owner nds convenient to pay each manager the equilibrium
wage v (n) rather than let him go and start a new negotiation with another manager.
Let us prove the lemma by contradiction.
Suppose inequality (.1) does not hold, that is:
h
p (Y  (n))  2
p
v (n)
i
yi (n) 
h
p (Y  (n+ 1))  2
p
v (n+ 1)
i
yi (n+ 1)
This expression can be solved by iteration and, for each rm under the potential
market entry of k entrepreneurial rms, the following result ensues:
v (n)  p (Y
 (n))2
4
  [p (Y
 (n+ k)) yi (n+ k)]
2   4 [yi (n+ k)]2 v (n+ k)
4 (yi (n))
2
Since in this model there are no entry costs, room potentially exists for an innite
number of entrants. Thus, taking the limit of expression above for k that tends to
innite, we get:
v (n)  p (Y
 (n))2
4
  lim
k!1
[p (Y  (n+ k)) yi (n+ k)]
2   4 [yi (n+ k)]2 v (n+ k)
4 (yi (n))
2
from which:
2
p
v (n)  yi (n)  p (Y  (n))  yi (n)  lim
k! 1
i (v
 (n+ k) ; n+ k)
Now, deriving from expressions (2.4) and (2.8) every n th managerial equilibrium prot
as:
i (v
 (n+ k) ; n+ k) =
a2
h
(n+ k)2 + 32 (n+ k) + 16  6p2 (n+ k)  8p2ih
(n+ k)2 + 24 (n+ k) + 16
i2
(n+ k + 1)2
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and applying the Hopital rule to solve the limit of the above expression, it ensues that:
2
p
v (n)  yi (n)  p (Y  (n))  yi (n)  0
from which:
2
p
v (n) = AC (yi (n))  p (Y  (n))
that contradicts the assumption of every managerial rms positive protability. Note
that the proof of the lemma can similarly be applied to case II, by substituting the
expression for every rms prot i (v (n+ k) ; n+ k) with the following expression:
i (v
 (n+ k) ; n+ k) =
=
a2((n+k)6+25(n+k)5+249(n+k)4+1255(n+k)3+3342(n+k)2+4392(n+k)+2192)
[(n+k+2)2[(n+k+3)2[(n+k+4)2[(n+k+5)2[(n+k+6)2(n+k+7)2(n+k+1)2]]]]]
2
that also converges to zero for k that tends to innite.
Proof of Lemma 2. Under the following standard assumptions:
@2p (Y )
@Y 2
yi +
@p (Y )
@Y
< 0 (A.2.1)
and,
@p (Y )
@Y
  @
2Ci (yi)
@y2i
< 0 (A.2.2)
the following inequality holds:
i (v
 (n) ; n) > i (v
 (n+ 1) ; n+ 1) (.2)
Proof. (Standard) Assumptions (A.2.1) and (A.2.2) always imply that Y  (n) <
Y  (n+ 1) and yi (n) > y

i (n+ 1) : Given this, and using rst order conditions, it
ensues that:
di (n)
dn =
dyi
dn p+ y

i
dp
dY 
dY 
dn   dCdyi
dyi
dn =
=

p  C 0

dyi
dn + y

i p
0 dY 
dn = y

i p
0

dY 
dn  
dyi
dn

< 0:
.
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